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Cumulative Voting and Single Member Districts in Industrial Organization
Abstract
Lani Guinier's proposals were neither radical nor undemocratic. In fact, cumulative voting is more efficient,
democratic, and fair than the plurality rule single member district arrangement currently in use in most of
the United States that Guinier's critics held up as the paragon of democracy. The importance of these
qualities, especially to minorities in a pluralistic democracy, cannot be overstated. Efficient, democratic,
and fair electoral systems prevent government from ignoring minority rights and interests by turning mere
enfranchisement into empowerment, which in tum, affords minorities the same access to and
proportionate power in America's social, economic, and political institutions.
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Cumulative Voting
and Single Member
Districts in Industrial
Organization
by Joshua Yount

The ideas of economists and political
philosophers, both when they are right and
when they are wrong, are more powerful
than is commonly understood Indeed the
world is ruled by little else. (Holcombe 1994,
p.386)
J.M. Keynes
I am inclined to believe that monopoly and
other imperfections are at least as important,
and perhaps substantially more so, in the
political sector as in the market place.
(Becker 1976, p. 37)
G. Becker

L INTRODUCTION
In 1993 Bill Clinton nominated Lani
Guinier to head the civil rights division ofthe
Department of Justice. Soon after, GuinieT's
nomination became embroiled in controversy
when the media and conservative legislators
began to examine her writings on electoral

remedies to Voting Rights Act violations.
Almost immediately, Lani Guinier became
~own as the "quota queen" and herwritings
were derided as undemocratic and racially
preferential. Still smarting from "nanny-gate,"
President Clinton quickly moved to avoid
further attacks and withdrew Guinier's
nomination. Foremost among the charges
raised against Guinier was that her advocation
of cumulative voting as an alternative to
districting as a remedy for minority voting
strength dilution represented an affiont to
democracy and was designed to unfairly
advantage minorities. Unfortunately, the truth
was somehow lost in the fury of political
maneuvering and press sensationalism.
Lani Guinier's proposals were neither -
radical nor undemocratic. In fact, cumulative
voting is more efficient, democratic, and fair
than the plurality rule single member district
arrangement currently in use in most of the
United States that GuinieT's critics held up as
the paragon of democracy. The importance of
these· qualities, especially to minorities in a
pluralistic democracy, cannot be overstated.
Efficient, democratic, and fair electoral
systems prevent government from ignoring
minority rights and interests by turning mere
enfranchisement into empowennent, which in
tum, affords minorities the same access to and
proportionate power in America's social,
economic, and political institutions.
Evidence to support the claimed
superiority of cumulative voting can be found
in the literature on voting theory, comparative
politics, public choice, and voting rights, but
this study will focus on a relatively unexplored
. approach to electoral systems. Single melTlber
district, plurality rule will be compared to
cumulative voting within the industrial
organization paradigm, in order to examine
each system's effect on competition, consumer
choice, and democratic fairness. It will be
argued that cumulative voting better reflects
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consumer preferences and demand, induces
more and better competition in elections, and
prevents majority "monopolization" of the
political process. As the United States and
other nations begin to recognize the pluralistic
nature of their societies, and as new nations
embrace democracy -and individual liberty,
cumulative voting is an alternative that should
be, and incr~asingly is, considered for use.
Therefore, this study is important in that it
sheds light on cumulative voting and adds to
the evidence supporting the system's use.
First, voting in general will be analyzed and
evaluated to assess the importance of different
systems. Then, cumulative voting and single
member district plurality rule will each be
described and evaluated to provide an
understanding ofthe qualities of each system.
Next, the study will proceed to its central
foals, evaluating both electoral systems within
the industrial organization paradigm to
determine each system's effect on competition,
representation, and fairness. Finally, the
evidence surrounding cumulative voting and
single member districts generated by a review
ofthe real world uses ofcumulative voting will
be examined.

II. VOTING SYSTEMS REALLY
MATTER
Voting systems generally have three phases
that are open to variation; balloting,
districting, and electoral formula (Rae 1967).
Balloting is the "specification of the voter's
role in deciding the election" (Rae 1967, p.
16). In other words, balloting instmcts the,-..
voter how to vote in terms of the number of
votes cast, the way the votes can be arranged,
and whether voters vote for parties or
candidates. Districting produces "the units
within which voting returns are translated into
distributions of parliamentary seats" (Rae
1967,. p. 19). The importance ofthe districting
process is that the magnitude of districts, or
number of seats per electoral unit, detennines
the degree ofproportionality of representation
from the district (Rae 1967, p. 20). Electoral
fonnulae provide the method of translating
votes into outcomes, in essence deciding who
won and who lost. There are primarily two
types of fonnula in use,[1] the plurality rule,
and proportional representation (PR). The
plurality system elects the person or party with
the most votes, regardless of what portion of
the total that is, as the only winner from' a field
of candidates. Proportional representation,
conversely, elects multiple candidates or
parties according to their proportional strength
in the electorate and the percentage needed 10
gain a seat. One additional concept supplies a
fourth basis of differentiation among electoral .
systems. The exclusion threshold is the
percentage of votes needed to assure victory,
although victory may be won with a lower
amount. It is a function of the number of
seats available in an election,[2] the more seats
available the lower the exclusion threshold
(Still 1992; Guinier 1994). Because different
concepts, approaches, and combinations of
approaches can be used in each phase of an
or' -

As the u.s. and· other nations
begin to recognize the
pluralistic nature of their
societies, and as new nations
eDlbrace dennocracy and
liberty, cunnulative voting is

an alternative that should
be...considered for use.

The Park Place Economist v.3

32



electoral system there is no limit on the
number of possible electoral systems.
The fact that in practice there are so many
different electoral schemes is not without
reason. All three phases of an electoral system
have an effect on the outcome of an election,
thus different electoral systems that alter
different phases of the process will cause
different outcomes. In other words, electoral
systems are not merely perfect mirrors that
reflect voter preferences as electoral outcomes
without affecting that outcome. The type of
mirror used has a profound effect on how
voter preferences are reflected (Lakeman
1974, p. 29; Rae 1967; Arrow 1963; Guinier
1994).
.
The fact that this_is true is borne out by the
contentious arguments that surround decisions
about how officials will be elected. For
instance, in the American south, the entire
history of electoral law since the civil war is
~ased on attempts by one faction or another to
control local government. Between the 1870's
and the 1960's whites instituted electoral
"reforms" that in addition to effectively
disenfranchising blacks, made it impossible for
minority candidates to be elected. Since the
1960's minority interests through the federal
government have manipulated electoral
systems to guarantee a more egalitarian
distribution ofrepresentation. Systems matter.

populated districts,[3] equivalent in number to
the quantity of seats available in the elected
body.[4] Then the electoral formula, plurality
rule, designates the one candidate in each
district with the most votes as the winner. In
addition, the exclusion threshold would be
SOOh, therefore requiring a candidate to receive
half the electorates votes to be guaranteed
victory. For example, SMD would divide a
state with a 35 person legislature into 35
equally populated districts, from which voters,
casting one vote a piece, would elect the top
vote-getter from each district.
Single member district plurality rule is the
fonn that all congressional and almost all state
legislative elections take. Also, though not as
frequently, SMD is used for local and ..
municipal elections. Its popularity today has
two sources. The first is tradition. SMD
originated in England during feudal times as
the way the fiefdoms were represented to the
King. Each feudal estate had a representative,
thus it was the land that was the basis for
representation. This system evolved, and with
the addition of a representative for each
medieval town, paved the way for the British
Parliament. American colonists, in turn,
adopted it from the British and made this
system the foundation of their new republic
(Guinier 1994). Recently, however, SMD has
come into even greater use as corrective
strategy to combat: at first Southern, but later
nationwide, attempts to prevent minorities
from having electoral power. By replacing
at-large electoral systems that commonly
dilute minority voting strength with SMD that
takes advantage of geographic segregation to
give minorities more control over their
representatives, governments have taken a step
to grant effective representation to groups that
had previously been denied (Grofinan et al
1982; Davidson and Korbel 1984).
The widespread use of the single member
district plurality rule system results from some

A. SINGLE MEMBER DISTRICTS
(SMD)

The most common electoral system in the
United States is the single member district with
plurality rule. In terms of the three phases
introduced above, SMD plurality rule specifies
procedures for each. In the balloting phase, the
voter is presented with a series of candidates
and is asked to cast a vote for one. Districting
in this system divides a geopolitical entity in
which an election is taking place into equally
33

particularly beneficial qualities that the system
possesses in terms of representation and
governance. SMD's strongest trait is its ability
to represent the geographical groups within a
geopolitical area. This quality is thought to
foster many other important goals of a "fair"
electoral system. First, the narrowed
jurisdiction of single member districts, as
opposed to a simple at large system, allows
and encourages constituencies to become more
active in supporting candidates because ofthe
head to head nature of the election and the
increased worth of a voter's vote. Second, a
representative of a district is more likely to
share the feelings of hislher constituency
because representative's election depends only
on the district's perception of himlher, rather
than the entire geopolitical unit. Also, the
representative is likely to reside in the district
and thus will tend to share many of the
constituent
preferences.
Finally,
the
representative will seem to be more accessible
to constituents who can geographically identify
the person who specifically represents them
(Weaver 1984).
In addition to the geopolitical benefits of
SMD, stable two party governance is a
consequence of the winner-take-all nature of
plurality rule, which awards sole political
. representation of an entire district to the
plurality winner, no matter how fractured the
electorate is. In other words, a SMD plurality
system tends to promote stability by not
reflecting many of the divisions within the
electorate. A third area of benefit comes in
terms ofminority representation, which can be
aided through the geographic clustering of
minorities that frequently occurs due to
voluntary and involuntary segregation.
Districts drawn to reflect this clustering will
provide minorities with opportunities to elect
their own representatives that may not have
existed in an at-large system. The enforcement
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of the Voting Rights Act by the Federal
government through the use of SMD to
correct minority vote dilution reflects .this
beneficial trait (Weaver 1984; Grotinan et al
1982; Guinier 1994).
On the other hand, SMD suffers from some
shortcomings as well. One source of problems
is the flipside of the geopolitical benefits
discussed above. Close ties between
representatives and constituents also have the
negative effects of producing representatives
with overly parochial concerns and allowing
obscure district politics to go unscrut~ed.
Even more fundamentally, however, creating
geographic districts is well suited as strategy
to extend representation only to the extent that
interests are predominantly geographic.._
Although this may have been true at one time,
geography is no more determinative of
political preferences than race, gender, or
income today. In addition, the arbitrariness of
creating districts, within a geopolitical entity
leads to genymandering and the dismantling of
smaller geopolitical entities in the name of
party politics so that districts describe only a
geographic area rather than any cohesive
community (Weaver 1984; Guinier. 1994;
Note 1982).

It is completely unproductive
from a social standpoint to
perpetuate segregation by
creating electoral structures
that increase disincentives to
integrate
America's
geopolitical entities.
SMD makes two crucial, yet not
completely accurate or helpful assumptions.
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First, it is assumed that geography is a proxy
for racial or ethnic minorities, and second that
race or ethnicity is a proxy for political
preferences that are being privileged. Racial
and ethnic minorities are not always
geographically segregated, Latinos in the
Southwest are an example. Nor do all voters
within a particular minority have the political
leanings that are projected on them as a group.
Therefore, single member districting is a weak
strategy for improving minority representation.
Furthermore, it is completely unproductive
from a social justice standpoint to perpetuate
segregation by creating electoral structures
that increase disincentives to integrate
America's geopolitical entities (Guinier 1994;
Cole, Taebel, and Engstrom 1987; Note
1982).
In addition, single member districting can be
and has been used to dilute minority voting
strength in the same way it is used to dilute
majority political monopolization. rhis is
exactly how the majority monopolizes the
political system in the first place. Furthermore,
because the entire concept of districting to
create certain majorities necessarily creates
other minorities, at least one group's voting
strength is arbitrarily being diluted when a
district is created to combat the vote dilution
facing another group. In the face ofthis, even
a government concerned with fairness would
have to choose which groups have the right to
representation and in what amounts.[5] Also,
the stable two party government resulting from
winner-take-all plurality role prevents any third
party from reinvigorating the political process,
denies minorities, broadly defined, a voice in
their representation, over represents the
majority,[6] and wastes the votes of at least
half the electorate.[7] (Weaver 1984; Grofman
et al 1982; Still 1984; Guinier 1994; Note
1982).

Cumulative voting is a semi-proportional
electoral system combining aspects of pluraIity
and proportional systems. In the balloting
phase each voter is given a quantity of votes
equal to the number of seats available within
their district. Voters are then able to distribute
their votes among the candidates in any way
they wish, including placing multiple votes on
individual candidates. For example, in a district
with three seats up for election, a voter may
place one vote on each ofthree candidates, or
may place two votes on one candidate and one
on another, or may place all three votes on one
candidate.[8] Districting varies with CV, it
could leave the geopolitical entity intact,
thereby placing all voters in the same district,
or it could divide the electorate into districts...
When CV creates multiple districts, they are
usually identifiable geopolitical subdivisions
and do not necessarily have to be equally
populated, because the seats available are
apportioned to the districts according to
population. By way of example, Lani Guinier
suggests that if CV were used in New York
City, the city could be divided into its five
boroughs and each borough would have a
quantity of city council seats proportiC?nate to
their respective populations (Guinier 1994, p.
155).
The electoral formula in CV is
semi-proportional in that it elects more than
one
candidate,
and thus
is
not
"winner-take-all," and yet does not allocate
seats in strict proportion to votes, but rather
grants one seat to each of the winners, no
matter how many votes they get. For instance,
in a three seat race, the top three vote-getters
in the election would each win a seat, even if
the first place winner had twice as many votes
as the second or third place winners. The
exclusion threshold for this system is almost
inversely proportional to the number of seats
available. With five open seats, the exclusion
threshold is 1/6 or 16.7%, thus requiring a

B. CUMULATIVE VOTING (CV)
35

candidate to gamer only little less than 17% to
be guaranteed victory (Guinier 1994;
Lakeman 1974, pp. 87-90; Still 1984).
CV traces its roots to the Victorian age
when the modern world began to overtake
tradition, especially in the political realm. CV
was part of a larger reform movement
throughout Great Britain that wanted to open
government up to the common people and
minorities. South Africa, England, and the
State of Dlinois all experimented with it to
counteract potentially disruptive and tyrannous
majority minority divisions, but the system
never really caught on in any meaningful way.
Although CV was never widely used, if has
retained a following, and recently has been
looked at more closely, as pluralist nations_
search for ways to give minorities a better
chance to elect candidates (Lakeman 1974, pp.
87-90; Everson et al1982; Guinier 1994).
Cumulative voting is appealing for a
number of reasons. The fact that it is not
winner-take-aIl, but rather sends several
repreSentatives to the legislature has a number
of beneficial effects. First, there are less
wasted votes because more voters voted for a
winner. As a consequence of this, more
individuals have a representative in the
legislature. Finally, the existence of multiple
open seats creates a low exclusion threshold
that can prevent groups from being excluded
from governing and encourages more
candidates, as well as a larger variety of
candidates to run for office.
CV also improves the electoral prospects
for ~ority voters, both narrowly and broadly
defined. First, not having to rely on geography
allows minority voting power to be felt even
when that minority is not residentially
segregated. Second, the elimination of race
districting allows minorities to seek out
cross-cultural alliances with sympathizers who
may have been submerged in a majority district
The Park Place Economist v.3

otherwise. This points to possibly the most
beneficial aspect ,of cumulative voting, its
facilitation of voluntary "districting."
Throughout a geopolitical unit[9] in which CV
is being used voters of similar interests can
form "voluntary constituencies" based solely
on their individual views rather than their
geographic location or race. This allows
government to stay out of the business of
making assumptions about preferences,
eliminates the need to perpetuate segregation,
and induces voter participation among those
formerly in "safe" districts.
CV also ensures that those with the same
views who now have their votes together, will
not have those votes unfairly diluted in 'an
at-large system. By allowing voters to express - - .
the intensity oftheir preference by cumulating
their votes, those who have strong
preferences, even if they are smaIl in number,
can be heard in the political process.
Furthermore, CV reduces the politicking
involved in drawing and redrawing district
lines and picking which group is the majority
in each district because the extent of CV
jurisdiction is defined by natural geopolitical

By allowing voters to
express the intensity of their
preference by cumulating
their votes, those who have
strong preferences...can be
heard in the political
process.
divisions. Finally, CV causes the legislative
body to be more proportionally representative
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some valuable ~ights into the role of electoral
systems (Holcombe, 1994).
Just as society faces alternatives in dealing
with natural monopolies in industry, it must
also decide how to treat the sovereign
monopoly. Tullock cites three common
approaches;
laissez-faire
non-control,
regulation, and public ownership (1955, p.
458). A hands off approach gives government
the kind unacceptable free reign that has not
been seen since the fall of the divine.
monarchies. In addition it allows possessors of
the monopoly rights to erect insurmountable
barriers to entry. Public ownership surely
exists, but it is public operation that is lacking.
And . in view of Arrows impossibility
theorem,[ll] the inevitability of self-interest in ..
representation, and the massive costs of direct
democracy, public operation is unlikely.
Regulation is also unacceptable because ofthe
undemocratic control it would necessitate.
Although the Constitution, the Bill ofRights,
and the common law all are examples of
useful, and essential regulatory schemes
designed to control government monopoly,
regulation of this type over every aspect of
governmental action is unwarranted because it
would completely insulate government from
"consumer sovereignty" (Holcombe 1994, p.
146; Tullock 1955, p. 459). Consequently,
another scheme must be relied on to restrain
government monopoly power.
From a market point of view, the best
strategy would be to reduce the height of the
entry barriers that allow monopolies to fight
off challengers. Regular, competitive,
democratic auctions of the publicly owned
government'~ monopoly rights serve this
function well. Candidates and parties bid for
votes with promises of policy measures.
Demetsz suggests this type of competition will
eat away any monopoly profits (Holcombe
1994, pp. 146-7), and make government a
reflection ofpopular sentiment. This analysis is

of the electorate, and therefore a more true
reflection of the voters (Guinier 1994; Note
1982; Weaver 1984; Still 1992; Everson et al
1982).
Cumulative voting also has drawbacks,
however. Because it is more proportional, CV
tends to be less stable as various groups battle
for control. Furthermore, the procedures
involved with CV can be -confusing and not all
voters understand them, which can lead to an
inaccurate vote. In addition, the fact that no
representative is formally bound to a defined
constituency could lead to a distance between
voters and legislators that would be
detrimental. Finally CV can entail major use of
strategy by parties, candidates, and voters.
Parties fully want to exploit their strength, but
if too many oftheir candidates are competing,
all their candidates could suffer. Candidates
have to deal with these same issues when
deciding to enter and if they want to support
other candidates. Voters, who generally want
to balance their votes between those
candidates they most prefer, and those that
they like, who need their vote the most, have
strategic problems in CV elections as well
(Note 1982; Weaver 1984; Everson et al
1982).

C.GOVERNMENTASMONOPOLY
Because government is the only producer
of political and policy outputs, and there can
only be one government per market (national,
state, local) at a time, government can be
conceived of as a natural monopoly[10]
(Tullock 1955, pp. 458-9). The concept is so
common sense that government is not
frequently thought of in these terms. For
instance, the Bloomington city council has a
monopoly on producing city ordinances,
regulations, policies, expenditures, and certain
services. An analysis of government within the
industrial organization paradigm can provide
37

flawed however because it assumes perfect
competition for the monopoly rights of
government.

behavior will be different because electoral
strategies are system specific (Greenberg and
Shepsle, 1987).' Also, government will
accurately reflect citizen preferences to
varying degrees in different systems because
some systems do better at transforming
preferences into outcomes. Consequently,
higher quality competition will occur when a
community's political divisions are clearly
expressed.
Within the industrial organization paradigm,
single member district plurality rule and
cumulative voting can be seen as market
structures in the market that determines who
will govern. The market is the geopolitical
voting unit, the firms are the various
candidates, the good that is being offered is -,
government policy, and the consumers are the
electorate. Thus in each election, in each
geopolitical unit, candidates design and offer
their product in hopes of attracting voters,
because the candidate(s) with the largest
"market share" on election day will win the
election. As described above, the elements of
competition will vary among systems. It will
be posited that SMD, because of the type of
competition it engenders, is an oligopolistic
market structure. Likewise, the competition
involved in CV makes it a monopolistically
competitive structure.

1. Competition for govemment monopoly
Non-competitive aspects of the electoral
process have two sources; the status quo
owner of monopoly rights,. and the electoral
system itself: Because governments, or
majorities in democratic nations, have almost
unlimited monopoly power, government
officials who want to continue to earn the
benefits of monopoly power[12], will use
those powers to help maintain their position.
Examples of this type of behavior in the
American political system abound. The
seniority system in Congress gives voters
incentive to keep re-electing their
representative so that he/she can provide
better pork to the district. Also campaign
financing, franking privilege, and media
coverage are all manipulated in favor of sitting
legislators (Holcombe 1994, p. 98). The
degree to which American legislators can
advantage themselves is fortunately limited by
the competition introduced by the monopoly
regulation found in the Constitutional
commands placed on government (free press,
free speech, regular elections, separation of
powers, federalism) (Holcombe 1994, pp.
146-7).
Perhaps the greatest determinant of
competition is a very subtle one in American
politics, the electoral system. As was said
above, the system matters. Likewise, different
electoral systems can have quite different
impacts on a political race. Certainly, the
voting
system
employed
contributes
significantly to the number and quality of
competitors and potential competitors by
placing baniers on the quantity and positioning
of competitors. Furthermore, candidate
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2. 8MD as Oligopoly
An oligopoly exists in an industry when a
small number of firms dominate the market.
Similarly, a political oligopoly can be said to
be present in the political market for the
. government's monopoly powers when a few
candidates and or parties dominate the
electoral process. Certainly the two-party
dominated history of elections in the U.S.
under SMD plurality rule makes a prima facie
case for the existence of an oligopoly. There is
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evidence, however, that oligopolies are
inherent in single member plurality electoral
systems. Douglas Rae in his examination of
electoral laws finds a "very strong
relationship" between plurality electoral
systems and two party system (1967, p. 95).
Likewise, Duvergers Law claims that the
"plurality method, by discriminating against
small parties, encourages a two-party system"
(Lijphart and Grofman 1984, p. 5).
Further evidence ofthe oligopolies nature
of the American system can be found in
manifestations of market power and the
existence of entry barriers. The Median Voter
Model hypothesizes that in plurality single
winner elections, where issues are one
dimensional and voters preferences are single_
peaked, the candidate who has the support of
the median voter will win. Because candidates
in plurality elections attempt to maximize
votes, in positioning their candidacy they will
tend toward the median voter (Nicholson,
199~,.p. 783; Downs, 1957, pp. 139-41). This
effect tends to push candidates ideologically
and policy~wise together. In this sense the
political oligopoly model mirrors the kinked
demand model ofoligopoly because candidates
have a disincentive to change their platforms in
any direction when they are at the equilibrium
median voter position, just as firms will tend
not to move from the kink in their demand
curves. Another similarity ofthe convergence
tendency is the Hotelling's principle of
minimum differentiation which predicts
competitors imitate each other, thus producing
a standardized product (Shepsle and Cohen
1990, p. 17).
Still many scholars have discovered
shortcomings of the Median Voter Model in
plurality elections. First, an election with more
than two candidates will not produce
convergence (Shepsle and Cohen 1990;
9rofinan 1993; Cox 1987). In addition,
potential competition will prevent convergence

in a two candidate race (Shepsle and Cohen
1990, 28-29). These nonconvergence effects
are militated against by the oligopolistic nature
of SMD plurality rule, however. First, as
discussed above, pluralities tend toward two
competitor races, thus reducing the possibility
of a multiple candidate race. Furthermore, an
oligopoly's collusive tendencies preempt the
introduction of other candidates, as the two
candidates move apart on an ideological scale
so as to prevent candidate entry on their
ideological flanks.[13] This may reduce the
threat ofa multiple candidate race, but it does
not eliminate the possibility that a .new
competitor could quickly enter and replace an
old competitor.[14]
In the face ofthis possibility, the oligopoly-
must resort to entry barriers to reduce the
residual threat of competition. These take at
least three foons. The institutional barriers that
the status quo government erects not only
protect government monopoly power, but also
preserve oligopolistic competition for that
power through the electoral rules that are
established. Also, the exclusion threshold of
plurality rule is quite high at SOOA., thus
providing a disincentive for third candidate
competition. Finally, districting can reduce
competition in two ways. It limits competition
by making smaller the jurisdiction that elects a
representative. In addition, the arbitrary nature
of the districting tool allows and, in fact,
encourages the creation of "safe districts", or
the use of "vote dilution", which are designed .
solely to undermine competition. Any
remaining distance between the median voter
and the positions taken by candidates to
prevent entry, is lost in the candidates'
intentional ambiguity which allows them to
simultaneously converge on the median voter
and appear to "hold down the fort." As Downs
says, "...parties will try to be similar and
equivocate" (1965, p. 137). In these ways
oligopoly market power is used to reduce
39

competitiveness, while at the same time
eliminate differentiation.

Finally, the tendency away from stable two
party competition will reduce the possibility of
political collusion that prevents third parties
from effectively entering the process and will
diminish the institutionalized political party
barriers.
Differentiation will occur in a cumulative
voting system because there is no presumption
of two party or two candidate competition,
thus Cox's formulation that multiple candidate
races will not converge holds (1987). In fact,
"the Eaton-Lipsey analysis demonstrates the
limited generalizability ofHotelling's Principle
of Minimum Differentiation," thus firms in
multiple candidate races, "... need not
collectively confront the consumer with 'an

3. CV as Monopolistic Competition
Cumulative
voting
approximates
in form and
monopolistic competition
function. Like a monopolistically competitive
industry, CV invariably has quite a few
candidates, and the candidates are
differentiated. Also, cumulative voting
engenders vigorous competition, in which
candidates try to carve out a niche to remain
successful, just as firms do in the market. The
two
distinguishing
characteristics of
cumulative voting in the monopolistic
competition paradigm are competition and
differentiation.
.
Because cumulative voting has more than
one seat at stake in an election, typically more
candidates will compete for office, thus
making elections more competitive. The
cumulative aspect of the process, in which
voters are able to "plump"[lS] votes, allows a
certain degree of preference intensity
revelation. The introduction of cardinal
preferences into the electoral market makes
demand as expressed in vote totals more
reflective ofthe "true demand" of a pluralistic
political society, and therefore more
competitive (Cole, Taebel, and Engstrom,
1990). Also, cumulative voting has relatively
low entry barriers, causing real and potential
competition to increase. Foremost among
these is its low exclusion threshold.
Institutional barriers will also be lower to the
degree that a more differentiated government
monopoly will face higher marginal costs in
producing legislation, thus will be unable to
pass restrictive rules (Crain, Holcombe, and
Tollison, 1979). In addition, the preservation
of natural political boundaries eliminates the
barrier erected by arbitrary apportionment.
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Because CV has more than
one seat at stake in an
election, typically more
candidates will compete for
office, thus making elections
more competitive.
excessive sameness."' (Shepsle and Cohen
1990, p. 20). This analysis predicts that
competitors will spread out along the policy
continuum, rather than bunching at the median
position.

IV. EVIDENCE
Since its inception, cumulative voting has
primarily been seen as a practical and fair way
to vote in jurisdiction that cannot agree to a
voting procedure because of the fear of
factionalism or majority tyranny. In its first
real-world usages, on the local level in parts of
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England and in South Africa during the last
third ofthe nineteenth century, its results were
generally favorable, allowing minorities to be
represented and reducing factionalism
(Lakeman 1974, pp. 87-90). The most
sustained usage of cumulative voting is found
in minois where the system was used to elect
the lower body ofthe legislature between 1870
and 1980. Originally instituted to mitigate the
geopolitical polarization of the state into a
pro-union Republican northern half and a
anti-union Democratic southern half following
the civil war, CV was designed to address "the
injustice and inequalities of majority rule"
(Everson et al 1982, p. 5). The system
"worked" in that it allowed the second party in
each half of the state to have representation.
Many of the theories about CV are also
confirmed by the Illinois experience.
Cumulative voting did provide more
did
not
proportional
representation,
overrepresent the majority, and increased the
role of the minority in governing. The
complaints about the lllinois experience, as to
its non-compeiitiveness and lack of candidates,
are not related to CV itself but rather are a
function of the strong party control and
collusion ofthe political process, and thus can
be dismissed. Furthermore, the reasons for the
systems repeal in 1980 were connected to
voter anger over a pay increase, rather
substantive complaints about the system itself:
The conclusion reached by many scholars is
that CV in Dlinois did "prevent the tyranny of
an overwhelming majority" (Everson et al
1982; Kuklinski 1973). The long use of
cumulative voting by corporations to elect
boards of directors further attests to the
usefulness of the system as better way to
represent an electorate (Guinier 1994, Note
1982).
The most recent uses of CV have come in
response to violations of the Voting Rights
Act's prohibition against minority vote

dilution. In Alamogordo, New Mexico, where
Latinos and Blacks have seen their votes
diluted and the lack of geographic segregation
prevents effective districting, CV is being
employed to ensure better minority
representation. The institution of the system
resulted in a Latino woman being elected
at-large in the first election, mostly on the
strength of Latino voters (Cole, Taebel, and
Engstrom 1990). Likewise, a school district in
South Dakota has seen positive results, in
terms of Native American representation, by
changing to cumulative voting (Engstrom and
Barrilleaux, 1991). Finally, some Alabama
localities, including Chilton County, have
experimented with cumulative voting .to
increase black representation. Surprisingly, not
only did black representation jump after the
institution ofthis system, but the Republicans,
another under-represented group in rural
Alabama, also increased their representation
(Still, 1992). Together, the evidence of
cumulative voting usage indicates that it is an
effective tool for improving minority
representation.

v.

CONCLUSION

This study of cumulative voting and single
member district plurality rule attempted to use
a novel application of industrial organization
economic theory to explain why cumulative
voting is a superior electoral system. The
industrial organization paradigm, by providing
concepts, such as oligopoly, monopolistic
competition, and entry barriers, lends· further
insight into the advantages of cumulative
voting, in tenns ofcompetition, representation,
and fairness. By positing SMD plurality rule as
an oligopolistic political market structure and
CV as monopolistically competitive one, it was
determined that CV was more competitive,
representative, and fair, as an electoral system.
This conclusion was buffeted by many
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theoretical arguments coming from the
literature surrounding voting rights, public
choice, and voting theory. Furthermore, the
field research done on actual instances of
cumulative voting usage also lends credence to
the conclusions drawn. Certainly further
empirical research is needed concerning
cumulative voting, and as more localities
become more familiar with CV, the evidence
surrounding its real world effects will improve.
But, policy implications can be drawn from
this preliminary study.
Cumulative voting should be considered as
a viable electoral strategy for all types and
levels of elections that simultaneously elect
multiple candidates. This would as a whole
improve American elections,--in terms of -
representation, competition, and fairness, three
qualities that are essential to a well functioning
democracy. This recommendation can be taken
further for those localities that are
experiencing destructive factionali~m ·or
minority exclusion and majority dominance.
Simply put, cumulative voting should be
instituted as soon as possible in these areas
because although not a panacea, it certainly
has proved useful in equitably easing the
tensions that arise in those situations. As the
United States moves toward a more
integrated,
culturally
diverse
future,
cumulative voting should prove to be an
integral part ofthe American electoral system.
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NOTES

[1] A third fonnula is the majoritarian system
which requires that the winner be able to beat
all other candldates or parties combined,
meaning the winner has to gamer at least fifty
percent ofthe votes. The difficult of achieving
this feat has made majoritarian systems rare,
and thus it has been left out.
[2] In both CV and SMD plurality he
exclusion threshold is 1/(1+S), where S is·the
number of seats available in the election.
[3] Prior to the early sixties when a series of
court cases, (Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960),
Baker v. Carr (1962), Gray v. Sanders (1963),
Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), and Reynolds v.
Sims (1964)) created the "one man one vote"
standard, districts did not have to be, and were
rarely, equally populated.
[4] Through the process of reapportionment,
districts are redrawn to adjust to population
shifts on a regular basis. In America this
43

occurs every ten years, coinciding with the
census.
[5] In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey
(1977) this was precisely the issue. In creating •
a minority majority black district in New York
a minority majority Jewish district had to be
dismantled, causing quite a conflict between
calls for fair representatio~ among both
groups.
[6] The cube law predicts that the majority
party will be over represented because (1-8)/8
= [( 1-V)N]K where 8 is the percentage of
seats won by the party, and V is the
percentage votes received by the party and K
is 3, when two parties have 90% ofthe vote.
[7] A wasted vote can be defined as a vote that
does not elect a candidate. Thus any vote that
is superfluous for the winner, or goes to the
loser is wasted.
[8] The practice ofplacing all ofone's votes on
a single candidate is called plumping.
[9] A geopolitical unit is geographic area
defined by a political jurisdiction. For example,
towns, counties, and states all can be
considered geopolitical units. In addition,
voting districts can also be considered a
geopolitical unit, but many times the arbitrary
and illogical definition of these districts
prevents them from being genuine geopolitical
units, that have an identity apart from their
role in the electoral process.
[10] Following Crain, Holcombe, and Tollison
(1979), marginal cost would be ~onstant
because each additional policy action within a
given government involves the same
"processing and approval procedures"(54-s).
But average cost would be declining because
there is a fixed cost of gaining control of the
monopoly (government). Government output
in terms ofpolicy etc. would be determined by
marginal valuation and the average cost
(graph). Furthermore, the fixed cost can be
expected to be quite high and thereby impose
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a kind. of entry barrier that protects the status
quo government from competition for its
monopoly rights.
[11 ] Arrow proved that no system of
aggregating society's preferences could be
devised that would meet five innocuous
requirements.
[12] These benefits include not only the
monetary rewards ofgovernment service, but
also the prestige and other psychic benefits of
government positions. Monopoly power also
entails the ability ofa legislator to deviate from
the societally optimal production of services,
in favor of the most personally profitable
production point.
[13] The importance of this kind of political
rear guard maneuver is abundantly clear-in the '~'...-.-.
recent history of the Republican party. In
1964, Bany Goldwater, in essence, outflanked
the Rockefeller Republicans, and by 1980 the
conservatives had taken complete control of
the party. George Bush's move to the right
after difficulties with the Buchanan faction of
his party in 1992 is an example of an attempt
to head off a flanking action.
[14] The experience of the Republican and
Whig parties between 1856 and 1864 is a good
example ofthis effect.
[15] Plumping is the act of placing all of one's
votes on one candidate.

